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It is well-known that Choice and Regularity are
independent of each other but have important
common consequences of logical character (re-
flection principles, representations of classes by
sets, etc.). In my talk, I shall try:
(A) To explain this phenomenon,
(B) To consider relationships between these
consequences (and near principles) in detail,
and besides,
(C) To consider some arguments related to
truth of various principles in set theory .
All theorems can be proved in ZF, the Zermelo-
Fra¨nkel set theory, minus Regularity (quite of-
ten in some its fragments).
Choice and Regularity
Basic definitions:
A function F : X →
⋃
X is a choice function iff
F(x) ∈ x for all nonempty x ∈ X.
A relation R ⊆ X × X is well-founded iff each
nonempty subset S ⊆ X has an R-minimal el-
ement (i.e., x ∈ S such that ¬(y R x) for all
y ∈ S − {x}).
An ordering ≤ is a well-ordering of X iff each
nonempty subset S ⊆ X has a ≤-least element
(i.e., x ∈ S such that x ≤ y for all y ∈ S).
Equivalently, ≤ is linear and well-founded.
The Axiom of Choice, AC. For any set there
is a choice function on it.
There are a number of equivalent principles,
the most famous are perhaps Zorn’s Lemma
(Kuratowski) and
The Well-Ordering Principle, WO. For any
set there is a well-ordering on it.
Theorem (Zermelo).AC is equivalent to WO.
AC has a deep impact on the universe of set
theory by giving as nice consequences, e.g.,
All cardinals form a well-ordered hierarchy
as well as ugly ones, e.g.,
The Banach-Tarski Paradox.
The Axiom of Regularity, AR. Any nonempty
set has an ∈-minimal element.
A set is well-founded iff ∈ is well-founded on
its transitive closure. Then AR is equivalent
to the sentence:
All sets are well-founded
(and another name of AR is the Axiom of
Foundation).
To formulate an equivalent principle, recall the
cumulative hierarchy of sets:
V0 = ∅,
Vα+1 = P(Vα),
Vα =
⋃
β<α
Vβ if α is limit.
Theorem (von Neumann).AR is equivalent to
V =
⋃
α∈Ord
Vα.
If R ⊆ X ×X is well-founded, we have:
(i) R-Induction
(ii) R-Recursion
(iii) The rank function
rkR : (X,R)→ (Ord,<)
i.e., a strong homomorphism stratifying X into
levels Xα:
X =
⋃
α
Xα
(iv) The transitive collapse
πR : (X,R)→ (
⋃
α
Vα,∈)
which is a strong homomorphism allowing to
get
Theorem (The Mostowski Collapsing Lemma).
Any extensional well-founded relation is iso-
morphic to a unique transitive one (and a unique
possible isomorphism is its transitive collapse).
So, AR has mainly a “simplifying” character:
we can use all these nice properties.
Quite often principles have local and global
forms. Typically, a local/global principle says
about sets/classes or one formula/all formulas.
Global versions of the previous principles:
The Global Choice, GC. There is a choice
function on the universe.
The Global Well-Ordering, GWO. There is
a well-ordering of the universe.
The Global Regularity, GR. Any nonempty
class has an ∈-minimal element.
(GR is a schema. To formulate GC, we add
a new functional symbol. For GWO, we add
a new predicate symbol.)
Lemma.
1. GR is equivalent to AR.
2. GWO implies GC.
3. GC implies AC.
4. AC+ ¬GC is consistent.
5. GC+AR implies GWO.
6. GWO+ ¬AR is consistent.
7. ¬AC+AR is consistent.
8. ¬AC+ ¬AR is consistent.
(The only hard clause is (4). Later I shall show
that one can sharp (5) by replacing “implies”
with “is equivalent to” and AR with a weaker
principle BF.)
To complete this account, note that Choice
plus Regularity together can be formulated in
a single way:
The Choice of Minimals, ACM. For any
set X there is a choice function F on X such
that F(x) ∩ x = ∅ for all nonempty x ∈ X.
The Global Choice of Minimals, GCM.
There is a choice function C on V such that
C(x) ∩ x= ∅ for all nonempty sets x.
Clearly,
Lemma.
1. ACM is equivalent to AC+AR.
2. GCM is equivalent to GC+AR.
Best-Foundedness
To explicate why Choice (mainly in the stron-
gest form GWO) and Regularity have common
consequences, I isolate their “intersection”: a
principle (called here Best-Foundedness) which
is consistent with negations of both axioms but
implies all these consequences.
Let me say that a well-founded relation E is
best-founded iff {x : rkE(x) = α} is a set for
every ordinal α.
By Replacement, then Uα = {x : rkE(x) < α}
is also a set for every α.
Examples. The empty relation on a proper
class is well- but not best-founded. ∈ is best-
founded on transitive well-founded sets, and
so (by the Mostowski theorem) all extensional
well-founded relations are best-founded.
The Best-Foundedness Axiom, BF. There
is a best-founded relation on V .
(The axiom is in the language with a new pred-
icate symbol.)
Lemma.
1. AR implies BF.
2. GWO implies BF.
3. BF+ ¬AC+ ¬AR is consistent.
The principle has a number of reformulations
(in appropriate languages). Define:
A is club iff it is ⊆-cofinal in V and for any
⊆-directed x ⊆ A we have
⋃
x ∈ A.
A is a basis iff {Pα(x) : x ∈ A ∧ α ∈ Ord} is
∈-cofinal in V .
Example. AR is equivalent to any of (1) and (2):
1. {Vα : α ∈ Ord} is club.
2. V1 (= {∅}) is a basis.
Under BF the sets Uα play much the same part
as the sets Vα under AR. E.g., {Uα : α ∈ Ord}
is club.
Moreover,
Lemma. BF is equivalent to any of (1)–(4):
1. There is a function F : V → Ord such that
F−1(α) is a set for all α.
2. There is a well-ordered ∈-cofinal in V class.
3. There is a well-ordered club class.
4. There is a well-ordered basis.
5. There is a well-ordered partition of V into
sets.
Clause (2) gives a visual notion about BF: in-
tuitively, ordinals of a model show its “height”;
then a model witnessing BF is “stretched up-
ward” while a model refuting BF is “inflated
in width”.
A similarity: GWO well-orders the whole uni-
verse while BF well-orders some its “essential”
part (a basis or a club). Moreover, this can be
maked in a natural way:
Lemma. If there is a well-orderable class that
is club (or a basis), then there is such a class
which is moreover ∈- and ⊆-well-ordered.
There are less obvious reformulations of BF,
one of which (concerning the ordinal definabil-
ity) I shall give a bit later.
Finally, BF is exactly what is missing in GC to
be GWO:
Theorem. GC+BF is equivalent to GWO.
(Cf. with (5) of Lemma above.)
Consequences
Showing that BF works, I shall consider fol-
lowing its consequences:
The existence of Skolem and Scott functions,
The reflection of formulas at sets,
The expressibility of the ordinal definability,
The representability of equivalence classes by
sets,
and relationships between them.
Let ϕ(u, . . . , x) be a formula with the parame-
ters u, . . . , x.
A function Aϕ is a Skolem function for ϕ iff
(∃x) ϕ(u, . . . , x) → ϕ(u, . . . , Aϕ(u, . . .)).
Similarly, let me say that a function Bϕ is a
Scott function for ϕ iff
(∃x) ϕ(u, . . . , x) → (∃x ∈ Bϕ(u, . . .)) ϕ(u, . . . , x)
and
(∀x ∈ Bϕ(u, . . .)) ϕ(u, . . . , x).
Thus Aϕ chooses a single point from the class
{x : ϕ(u, . . . , x)}:
Aϕ(u, . . .) ∈ {x : ϕ(u, . . . , x)}
while Bϕ separates from this class its subset
Bϕ(u, . . .) ⊆ {x : ϕ(u, . . . , x)}
such that the set Bϕ(u, . . .) is nonempty when-
ever the class {x : ϕ(u, . . . , x)} so is.
Remark. Scott was probably first who noted
that such functions can be used instead of
Skolem functions in absence of AC.
Consider the following schemas (in extended
languages):
The Skolem Principle, Sk. For any formula
there is a Skolem function.
The Scott Principle, Sc. For any formula
there is a Scott function.
Skϕ and Scϕ denote the instances of these
schemas.
Lemma.
1. Skϕ implies Scϕ.
2. AC+ Scϕ implies Skϕ.
3. BF implies Sc.
4. AC+BF implies Sk.
Via coding, one can formulate global variants
of Skolem and Scott functions (uniformly for
all formulas). A global Skolem function acts
like a choice function on definable classes while
a global Scott function separates subsets from
them. Let GSk and GSc denote the global
variants of Sk and Sc.
Lemma.
1. GSk is equivalent to GC+GSc.
2. GSk+BF is equivalent to GWO.
I need Scott (or Skolem) functions mainly to
have Reflection.
A class M reflects a formula ϕ(x, . . .) iff for all
x, . . . ∈M
ϕM(x, . . .) ↔ ϕ(x, . . .).
The Reflection Principle, RP. Each formula
is reflected at some set.
(RP is a schema, RPϕ are instances.)
It follows from RP that each true formula has
a set model.
Of course, the principle holds for finitely many
formulas as well. Let me rewrite it as follows:
If Γ is a finite set of formulas, then there is
a set M such that
M ≺Γ V.
Thus RP is a local variant of the Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorem. But unlike it, RP can be
proved inside (some) set theory:
Theorem. Sc implies RP.
(Take a Scott hull.)
Moreover, Sc gives a club class of reflecting
sets, and BF gives a club class of reflecting
sets of form Uα.
Remarks. 1. Without Choice, we know noth-
ing about the size of submodels.
2. The full Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem (with-
out an evaluation of the cardinality) can be
obtained in the same way as a metatheorem.
We consider two applications of Reflection. The
first concerns the finite axiomatizability:
Let us call a theory sufficiently rich iff it admits
a coding. (E.g., ZF minus Infinity so is).
Proposition. Let T be sufficiently rich consis-
tent theory and T ⊢ RP. Then T is not finitely
axiomatizable.
(Apply the Second Incompleteness Theorem.)
Examples. The theory consisting of Union,
Power Set, Replacement, and Best-Founded-
ness is not finitely axiomatizable. The same for
any its consistent extension (e.g., ZF). On the
other hand, in the Zermelo set theory Z (which
is finitely axiomatizable), RP is not provable.
Another application of RP: the description of
ordinal-definable sets inside of set theory.
A class is ordinal-definable iff it is of the form
{u : ϕ(u, α, . . .)} for some formula ϕ where all
α, . . . are ordinals. OD is the class of all ordinal-
definable sets. cl is the closure under Go¨del
operations.
A well-known fact: AR implies
OD = cl ({Vα : α ∈ Ord}).
It follows that OD is well-orderable and club
(and moreover, the largest inner model of ZF
with a global well-ordering definable via ∈).
We sharp:
Theorem. BF implies
OD = cl ({Uα : α ∈ Ord}).
(Use RP to prove ⊆.)
Corollary. BF holds iff OD is well-orderable
and club.
Thus again (like the characteristic of GWO via
BF and GC) we sharp an old result of form
Γ+AR implies ∆
by a new result of form
Γ+BF is equivalent to ∆
(where Γ and ∆ are some sets of formulas).
This supports a naturality of BF.
As the last interesting consequence of BF, con-
sider representations of equivalence classes by
sets.
Let ϕ(x, y) define an equivalence:
ϕ(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y, z) → ϕ(y, x) ∧ ϕ(x, z).
A function Fϕ represents the equivalence de-
fined by ϕ iff
ϕ(x, y) ↔ Fϕ(x) = Fϕ(y).
The Representation of Classes Principle,
RC. For any equivalence formula there is a rep-
resenting function.
(RC is a schema, RCϕ are instances.)
Of course,
Scϕ implies RCϕ
since any Scott function for ϕ represents the
equivalence in a “natural way”. But unlike
Scott functions, Fϕ(x) does not meet neces-
sarily the equivalence class {y : ϕ(x, y)}.
Sometimes AC suffices for some instances of RC:
Example. If ϕ expresses the same cardinality,
then AC implies Skϕ and so RCϕ.
Moreover,
Theorem. Let ϕ define an equivalence. Then
AC+RPϕ implies Skϕ.
Corollary. AC+RP implies RC.
Question. Is any of the following implications
provable:
1. AC implies Sc?
2. AC+ Sc implies Sk?
3. Sc implies BF?
4. GC implies BF?
5. GC implies RC? if No for (1)–(4).
Conjecture. No for all (1)–(5).
(Partial results.)
To prove consistency results of such kind, I de-
velop a method of construction of models via
automorphism filters (a generalization of well-
known permutation model method). Two main
technical obstacles arising without Regularity
(or with a proper class of atoms):
(i) Replacement,
(ii) The Transfer Theorem (Jech–Sochor).
Truth and
Interpretability Strength
ZFC is highly incomplete: there are very natu-
ral set-theoretical questions independent of it,
the most famous of which is perhaps the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis (which is really a third order
arithmetical sentence).
To complete ZFC, it was proposed a number
of principles of various kind having important
consequences: e.g.,
Large Cardinal Axioms,
The Axiom of Determinacy (Mycielski),
Proper Forcing Axioms (Shelah),
The Ω Conjecture (Woodin),
Generic Large Cardinals (Foreman),
The Inner Model Hypothesis (Sy Friedman),
etc.
Is there a general criterion for rejecting/accepting
such a principle as a true axiom about all sets?
Let me point out a simple criterion indicating
some principles as surely wrong. An idea: since
all mathematical objects are sets, an ideal TST
(“True Set Theory”) must capture all possible
theories. Hence having some T ⊆ TST and
examining a new principle Γ, we must reject Γ
if it restricts this possibility:
If T+ Γ loses the interpretability strength of
T then Γ is wrong.
Here: An extension T1 ⊇ T of a theory T
loses the interpretability strength of T iff there
is T2 ⊇ T non-interpretable in all T3 ⊇ T1.
Otherwise T1 extends T without loss of the
interpretability strength.
Example. “All sets are constructible”
V = L
is a nice axiom since it looks “empirically com-
plete”, but it loses the interpretability strength
of ZFC: Under V = L, there is no measurable
cardinals, even in inner models. So, it is wrong.
May be so is “All sets are ordinal-definable”
V = OD ?
or even “All sets are well-founded”
V =
⋃
α
Vα ?
(See Question below.)
To find a criterion indicating some principles
as surely true is much more hard. (Of course,
if ϕ is surely wrong then ¬ϕ is surely true but
too noneffective as a rule. E.g., cf. “there ex-
ists a nonconstructible set” with “ 0♯ exists”.)
Advancing in the same way, we can describe
only possibly true principles:
If T+ Γ extends T without loss of the inter-
pretability strength and does not interpretable
in T, then Γ can be true.
Such candidates for being true cannot be really
true all together because contradict to each
other. But some of them are concordant:
Example. Current large cardinal axioms form
a well-ordered hierarchy. (An empirical fact;
Woodin offers a partial explication.)
Remark. Criterions based on interpretability
are perhaps most important but not sufficient.
E.g., put T be
ZF− Infinity + ¬ Infinity + Con(ZFC).
ZFC is interpretable in T, but I think this the-
ory (in which infinite objects do not exist) is
not a correct theory of all sets. Likewise for
extensions of ZFC by large cardinals. (An ex-
plication is beyond my talk.)
Among the axioms of ZFC, only Extension-
ality (AE) and Regularity have an “impover-
ishing” character (since forbid sets of certain
structure); a character of AC is unclear; and
other axioms have an “enriching” character
(since permit to construct new sets). Does
this “impoverishment” really decrease the in-
terpretability strength? Under GWO, we have
easily the answer No:
Lemma. ZF−AE−AR+GWO can be exten-
ded by AE + AR without loss of the inter-
pretability strength.
Question. Can one extend without loss of the
interpretability strength:
1. ZF−AE−AR by BF?
2. ZF−AE−AR+BF by AE+AR?
3. ZF by GWO?
